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Abstract: Participant evaluations have been at the heart of recent discursive
(im)politeness research, yet despite their importance, there has been little con-
sideration of how we identify such behaviours and how we can substantiate
their worth in an analysis. In this paper, it is proposed that we need to distin-
guish between different, ordered, categories of evaluation because these pro-
vide different levels of evidence for participants’ understandings of (im)polite-
ness.
Using online comments from Daily Mail articles relating to the Penelope
Soto court hearings, I show that apparent agreements in the classification of
linguistic behaviour as (im)polite can mask disagreements in the underlying
rationales for those judgements. It is these rationales that provide the strongest
warrant for analysts because they represent the ideological basis behind an
individual’s understanding of politeness – why people should behave in this
way. This links to Haugh’s (2013) use of ‘moral order’ and also Eelen’s (2001)
key, but underdeveloped, notion of argumentativity. The rationale behind an
individual’s judgement provides the argumentative link between metapragmat-
ic behaviour and the social order. Classifications and positive/negative assess-
ments of person are only clues to this underlying rationale, and need to be
treated as such. Understanding these differences will assist analysts in assess-
ing the ideological weight of metapragmatic behaviour and provide better-in-
formed warrants for their analyses.
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1 Introduction
This article uses data from the comments section of online reportage to investi-
gate the nature of metapragmatic behaviour and how it can be theorized more
effectively. Following Haugh (2013), it is argued that the enthusiasm for the
concept of evaluation in discursive approaches to (im)politeness has overtaken
the degree to which it has been theorized. This article is an attempt to address
that balance. It offers a more nuanced way of thinking about evaluation by
identifying different types of evaluative behaviour and thus providing a robust
method of discriminating between the warrants that they can offer an analysis.
In turn, this approach also makes a contribution to the debate about the posi-
tion of metapragmatic comment within first and second order politeness (Eelen
2001; Kádár and Haugh 2013) as it demonstrates both how a lay theoretical
position would be constituted and how it could be identified.
Like the other papers in this special issue, the focus of attention is a Florida
courtroom bail hearing involving Penelope Soto and Judge Rodriguez-Chomat
where Soto swore and used a rude hand gesture.1 However, rather than examin-
ing their talk-in-interaction, this research looks at online newspaper reportage
of the event and the user-generated comments that responded to it. Video foot-
age of this event went viral in February 2013. The story was picked up by the
media in both the USA and the UK, leading to a flurry of discussion about
Soto’s behaviour, often centering on issues related to what could broadly be
termed (im)politeness. The particular stories chosen were published by the on-
line arm of the UK newspaper, The Daily Mail, and related to Soto’s bail hearing
and two further interactions with the USA court system. The point of focusing
on these metapragmatic comments is to identify what features of Soto’s behav-
iour prompted (im)politeness comments and how these were then related to
societal views of (im)politeness. The intention is to provide an interesting coun-
terpoint to the analyses of the courtroom interaction itself alongside a more
thorough exploration of evaluation as a tool for analysis.
The starting point for this research is the position that evaluation is not an
homogeneous category. It is argued that three different levels of evaluative
behaviour can be distinguished – moving from classifications of (im)politeness,
to assessments of person, to rationales underlying these judgements. These
warrant different things within an (im)politeness analysis, and recognizing this
1 A YouTube video of the interaction can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MbJTUrM0JsI. There is also a link via the original Daily Mail article (Reilly 2013a)
and links to the following court interactions can be accessed via the remaining two Daily Mail
articles (Reilly 2013b; Daily Mail Reporter 2013).
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will make our analyses more robust. A simple classification of some linguistic
behaviour as ‘polite’, ‘impolite’ or ‘rude’ does not, in itself, tell us why that
judgment has been made, for example. It is the rationale underlying these clas-
sifications that offers insights into that ideological function.
The idea of ‘rationale’ ties in with Eelen’s (2001) concept of argumentativi-
ty – which for him was an integral part of evaluation. However, this concept
has received little attention in recent years despite the focus on evaluation
within (im)politeness research. This may be because argumentativity was de-
scribed in somewhat abstract terms rather than in a way that could be applied
straightforwardly in an analytical setting. This is a deficit in current models of
evaluation given that Eelen posits argumentativity as the link between meta-
pragmatic behaviour and the mechanisms through which societal structures
can be invoked and thus reinforced; it is the potential link between metaprag-
matic behaviour and a conception of the ‘moral order’ (Garfinkel 1967; Haugh
2013; Kádár and Haugh 2013). The model of evaluation offered here addresses
this issue by elaborating the concept of argumentativity and demonstrating
how it can be operationalized as one type of evaluation, rationale, and clearly
differentiated from two others: classification and assessment. This puts argu-
mentativity back in its rightful place as an intrinsic part of evaluation, whilst
still allowing it to be distinguished from other kinds of metapragmatic behav-
iour.
Discriminating between different levels of evaluation in this way also has
a further benefit in terms of our theoretical understanding of the relationship
between metapragmatic behaviour and the different orders of (im)politeness.
Kádár and Haugh (2013) argue that there needs to be an acknowledgement of
the existence of lay theorizing about (im)politeness (i.e., second order meta-
pragmatic behaviour), however, they do not say how we should recognize such
behaviour. It is argued here that it can be located in the argumentative link
between classification/assessment behaviour and the posited moral order: what
we have termed the rationale.
In order to locate the data analysis, the first sections of this paper discuss
the notions of evaluation and argumentativity in detail before presenting a
model of evaluation that identifies and distinguishes the three different levels
introduced briefly above. The importance of discriminating these levels, and
the additional understanding it can offer, is then demonstrated through analyz-
ing the corpus of user-generated comments to online news reportage relating
to the Penelope Soto case.
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2 Evaluation and metapragmatic behaviour
Haugh (2013) has argued that the term ‘evaluation’ has been used rather loosely
in (im)politeness research since the discursive shift in the early 2000s brought
the concept to prominence. There was a shift away from analyst-centered theo-
retical approaches to a reliance on the identification of ‘evaluative moments’
in talk as a way of validating assessments of (im)polite behaviours. However,
the process of the identification and interpretation of these moments has been
left rather ‘under-theorised’ (Haugh 2013: 53), meaning there is no agreed way
to determine the strength of these analyses. In this paper, I will argue that
there are different components that make up the process of evaluation and
that, by identifying these and their different ideological effects, we can make
stronger claims about the inferences based on evaluations. In order to achieve
this, I will use Eelen’s (2001) notion of argumentativity as a bridge between the
evaluative moment and what Kádár and Haugh (2013) term the ‘moral order’:
the taken-for-granted assumptions of ‘proper’ behaviour that underlie any
claim to evaluate another.
The particular data focused on here is well-fitted to this task because it
provides an interesting intersection of participant types, metapragmatic com-
ment and first order/second order (im)politeness. One of the first issues with
the concept of evaluation is that only limited attention has been paid to the
potential differences between the metapragmatic behaviour of those engaged
in an interaction as compared to that of lay observers. The ‘discursive shift’
involved a shift away from an omniscient expert but it did not discuss the role
of different types (and degrees) of lay involvement. Kádár and Haugh (2013) set
out ways in which we might start to think about various types of participants
in these diverse contexts, and the extended types of participation that are now
more readily available in our mediated world. However, they have not applied
this to a data set or investigated how a particular configuration of participation
might affect the type and ideological impact of metapragmatic behaviour.
As research which is grounded in evaluations, the work reported here could
be considered what Grainger (2013) and Culpeper (2011) have termed ‘second
wave’ politeness research. Certainly, it is centered around metadiscursive reac-
tions to talk events but, unlike the kind of metapragmatic behaviour assumed
in work such as Eelen (2001) or Locher and Watts (2005), these are not the
judgements of those who are (or have been) directly engaged in a particular
interaction. They are cultural insiders in terms of the emic/etic distinction (or
at least position themselves as such) but they are not insiders to the emergent
process of this particular piece of talk. As such, they cannot offer the kind of
insider insights that the initial discursive shift in politeness research is predi-
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cated upon – while they might comment on the process of talk, they are not
strictly ratified participants (Goffman 1981). This does not invalidate the worth
of their metapragmatic behaviour as an analytical resource but it does require
awareness of this difference, particularly in relation to their different purposes
in engaging in it.
Kádár and Haugh (2013) discuss this issue in relation to the limitations of
Goffman’s participation framework for a mediated age. They make the point
that more complex understandings of participant roles are needed within our
digital and mediated world – overhearing audiences are a pivotal and expecta-
ble component of both traditional and online media. Indeed, Dynel (2011) ar-
gues that film audiences (and by extrapolation, TV and radio) should be consid-
ered ratified because there are features of recipient design that are managed
specifically for them. The situation is even more complex for the case here. The
original video data, which forms the basis for most of the articles in this special
issue, has not been manipulated or managed for an audience but is publically
available – thus making it subject to unratified overhearing. However, once the
video has been embedded into online newspaper reportage and has been sub-
ject to the mediatization process of being reformulated as reportage with news
values (Harcup and O’Neill 2001) for a particular audience, then that status
changes. Online readers become ratified participants in the metadiscussion that
is primed by the particular framing of the news event.
While they might be ratified in terms of their new role as a meta-recipient
(Kádár and Haugh 2013), they remain unratified as a participant in the original
talk. Kádár and Haugh (2013) characterize this engagement in the metaworld
as ‘vicarious participation’. This is a useful term because it nicely distinguishes
the metalayer of reportage and commentary from the field of action, yet also
captures the investment of imagined participation. These interactants have a
purpose in creating and posting comments; their actions serve to further medi-
atize the original event. In some cases, this involves a construal of the video
sequence as entertainment: Soto is someone merely to be laughed at (see exam-
ples 21, 23, 24 in section 5, which display elements of this). But in the majority,
Soto’s behaviour is the focus. These comments function as a way of indexing,
structuring and reinforcing presumed moral orders (Garfinkel 1967; Haugh 2013;
Kádár and Haugh 2013) that are thus implicitly presented as the basis for proper
social conduct. To an extent, this is no different from co-participant metaprag-
matic behaviour, which also has this ideological function. However, for those
engaged as co-participants in the social field, ideological concerns have to be
intertwined with the individual’s management of their own face and identity
practices within that particular interaction – their metadiscursive comments
may be shaped by competing goals. Therefore, while these data lack insights
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into the ongoing discursive construction of politeness in talk-in-interaction,
they are a rich source of (relatively) unadulterated evaluative behaviours by
metaparticipants who choose to engage and do so largely for the purpose of
social comment.2
In Eelen’s (2001) characterization of the different orders of politeness, all
lay metapragmatic behaviour was confined to first order politeness – broadly
speaking, the dividing line between the two concepts lay in the distinction
between lay and scientific approaches. Kádár and Haugh (2013: 87) argue that
the reality is more complex – that lay metapragmatic behaviour has a place in
both. For them, the distinction is between those who comment on talk in which
they view themselves as participants (either as a ratified participant in Goff-
man’s sense or as a metaparticipant) or those who observe talk (either lay or
analyst) and characterize it in systematic terms. Thus, scientific theorizing and
folklinguistic theorizing both count as second order politeness. This is an in-
sight that has been a long time coming in (im)politeness research. It has long
since been acknowledged in sociolinguistics in the context of the standard lan-
guage debate (e.g., Niedzielski and Preston 2003) that lay members of a society
have a structured understanding of the relationship between standard language
and dialects – it is just that their theoretical position is rather different to that
held by most linguists. Kádár and Haugh’s insight is important because it rec-
ognizes and properly values the underlying systematicity to lay analyses of
(im)politeness. Without this understanding, we are unlikely to identify the
broader social orders that shape the social practice of which (im)politeness
behaviour is a part.
In addition, in acknowledging that (im)politeness evaluations have an un-
derlying systematicity, Kádár and Haugh (2013) have created an epistemological
space within (im)politeness research for a lay, structured understanding of the
interpersonal aspects of social practice. Although this is not discussed within
their work (Haugh 2013; Kádár and Haugh 2013), it seems that this unfilled
theoretical space fits nicely with the Garfinkelian concept of the ‘moral order’
that they use to explicate (im)politeness behaviours. Of course, Garfinkel’s
(1967) conception of the moral order encompasses more than (im)politeness
2 This is not to say that there are no face issues here. The poster is laying claims to very
particular social positions so it is certainly a presentation of self (arguably, this is its key
purpose from the poster’s perspective). However, unlike co-present synchronous talk, the com-
menter does not need to take into account potentially conflicting face needs of others in the
same way. Those considering responding to online discussions have a choice about whether
to engage or not – if they perceive there to be potential face management issues they can
decide not to post. In contrast, someone engaged in a face-to-face context often does not have
that luxury.
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behaviours but, as we shall see, evaluations of (im)politeness behaviours are
not restricted to indexing social meanings about (im)politeness. The interac-
tions of meanings within social practice are not so easy to disentangle: folklin-
guistic theories of (im)politeness are always going to be enmeshed within
broader lay social understandings of social practice. Thus when the concept of
the moral order is invoked as part of the analytical process in this article, I
am equally invoking a second order folklinguistic theoretical perspective on
(im)politeness behaviour.
However, one issue does remain with Kádár and Haugh’s (2013) argument
that metapragmatic behaviour has a place in both first order and second order
(im)politeness. This is the question of what means we can use to classify (an
aspect of) a specific behaviour on a particular occasion in terms of these two
categories. It is clear that invoking the idea of participation to differentiate them
would be insufficient. As Kádár and Haugh (2013: 84–85) recognize, we can all
be both participants and observers in the self-same interaction. Thus, the ques-
tion remains of what particular behaviours count as involvement in the evalua-
tive moment (first order) as compared to observationally-based theorizing about
folklinguistic systems (second order). Another important issue is whether these
can be achieved simultaneously. In terms of identifying both what counts as
evaluative, metapragmatic behaviour and what that behaviour can tell us about
(im)politeness and the moral order, this is an important distinction and key
to developing robust ways of judging the validity of evidence for particular
analyses.
As I will show in this research, there is a difference between classifying
behaviour as (im)polite (or (in)appropriate), making assessments about people
and providing evidence for beliefs about the moral order. These could all be
seen as ‘evaluations’ but they do not have the same kinds of ideological weight
or tell us the same things. Understanding this is critical to teasing apart the
relationship between types of metapragmatic behaviour and the validation for
analyses it can offer. This is brought into sharp relief in these data because
although explicit classifications of behaviour as being (im)polite are rare, there
are other discursive moves indicating an extremely high level of agreement that
Soto’s actions in the courtroom were considered ‘inappropriate’. So the simplis-
tic idea of evaluation being framed in terms of classifications of (im)politeness
or even (in)appropriateness would not provide an insightful analysis. However,
it is also evident that there is a discursive struggle concerning judgments of
Soto’s person and the rationales used to support these. An effective analysis of
evaluation and metapragmatic behaviour needs to access these, and differenti-
ate them from classificatory behaviour – this is still evaluation but it is of a
different type.
Brought to you by | University of Leeds
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/13/18 11:18 AM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON128 Bethan L. Davies
My thesis in this research is that it is through these rationales that we will
gain the greatest insights into the differing conceptions of the moral order –
and that it is these that constitute evidence for second order lay theorizing about
(im)politeness. It is in these rationales that we see what Eelen (2001) identified
as argumentativity – the social positioning and indexing that is achieved
through evaluation. While the concept of evaluation has been taken up widely
within (im)politeness research, its partnering concept has been largely left be-
hind, perhaps because it was left rather undertheorized. This is a pity because
in Eelen’s model, the locus of social struggle – the ideological element – appears
to be in the concept of argumentativity not evaluation per se. The purpose of
this article is to show why we need to recognize argumentativity as the key part
of evaluative metapragmatic behaviour, and how doing so can sharpen up our
understanding of the different elements of evaluation and provide better war-
rants for validating our use of metapragmatic behaviour in (im)politeness analy-
ses. This will involve developing and operationalizing Eelen’s concept of argu-
mentativity before demonstrating how it can be used to show the mobilization
of (im)politeness judgments as a resource for structuring and perpetuating un-
derstandings of moral orders.
3 Habitus, historicity and argumentativity
Eelen’s concept of argumentativity is dependent on Bourdieu’s concept of habi-
tus (Eelen 2001). This is concerned with how previous social experiences help
shape our social actions in future, and, in particular, why there are relative
similarities in the reaction of individuals when presented with a new context:
“all of my thinking started from this point: how can behaviour be regulated
without being the product of obedience to rules?” (Bourdieu 1994 in Maton
2012: 50). A person’s habitus is the result of all their previous social involve-
ment, reflecting their unique set of experiences and interactions (historicity); it
is in a process of continual evolution as a result of ongoing engagement with
social practice. While past experience does not determine an individual’s ac-
tions in a particular context, Eelen (2001: 222, original emphasis) argues that
“[p]resent action is the creative transformation of present conditions from a
position based in past experience”, thus allowing a mediating position between
(the constraints of) structure and (the autonomy of) agency. While Bourdieu
focuses on the relative commonality of social experiences within a particular
cultural milieu, thus enabling the potential for a degree of predictability in
the response to a particular social configuration, Eelen highlights the reverse
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perspective: habitus does not only account for a relative degree of self-regula-
tion in human behaviour, it also allows for variability. Many social experiences
may be shared but each individual will have a unique cultural and social trajec-
tory thus allowing for the combination of past experience and current involve-
ment to generate a range of different responses. It is this, Eelen argues, that
accounts for the variation in first order politeness – in both (im)politeness in
action and metapragmatic behaviour.3
Such social variation results in argumentativity: differences in social ac-
tions are not socially – and thus, ideologically – neutral. Choosing to employ
a particular configuration of linguistic elements positions the speaker in rela-
tion to the options that are – and are not – selected. Evaluating another’s
behaviour by classifying it as polite/impolite or engaging in metadiscourse
about (im)politeness has a social aim and social effects (Bourdieu 1991; Eelen
2001). The difference between variation and the argumentativity that comes
from evaluation seems to be that these invested classifications are used as a
resource for social meaning – to index particular discursive positions. They are
not ‘neutral’ scientific classifications, like biological taxonomies such as the
classifications of insects. To illustrate this distinction, Eelen uses the example
from the Nazi era of the ideologically-loaded classification of humans into Un-
termenschen and Übermenschen as a different categorization system that had
ideological effects in the structuring of beliefs in a society.
However, Eelen does not give a precise definition of argumentativity as
such. Initially, it is defined in a footnote: “[it] will be used in a loosely descrip-
tive sense, referring to various forms of ‘involvedness’ or ‘interestedness’.”
(Eelen 2001: 37). It’s meaning is only addressed further one more time in the
book’s penultimate chapter. Here, the argumentativity of (im)politeness behav-
iour (arising from variation) is seen as a “social tool of identification and dis-
tinction” (2001: 224), which is used to actively index information about the
social world. Neither of these moments work to specify the precise role of argu-
mentativity – the first being rather vague and the second trying to define argu-
mentativity in terms of politeness behaviour (which seems to be confusing the
role of explanandum and explanans). I would argue that this is a crucial omis-
sion in Eelen’s work, and may explain why this concept has not been taken up
with the same enthusiasm as the concept of evaluation. What we need is to go
back to the relationship between structure and agency: the structuring effect
of classification (or the particular (im)politeness choices made) is not in the
process of classification (or doing being (im)polite) itself but in the rationale
3 And by extension to lay theorizing about (im)politeness – thus crossing the boundary into
second order (im)politeness.
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that underlies those decisions. If I classify behaviour as ‘impolite’, it is my
rationale for doing so that shows how I think society should be ordered, it is
not the classification in itself. If I produce some politeness-in-action, it is the
reason that I chose that particular configuration of phenomena that offers the
insight into my conception of the moral order. The argumentative link between
(im)politeness behaviour/metapragmatic behaviour and some underlying con-
ception of the moral order is their rationales.
For example in Haugh (2013: 58–59), Lisa constructs a complainable about
an acquaintance, Edna, whom she negatively evaluates due to Edna’s behav-
iour when Lisa gave her a lift to church the previous week:
(1)4
15 Lisa: So I don’t wanna, – (1.2) I don’t wanna
16 pick up Edna for chu:rch. (hh)
17 (1.1)
18 Bob: Pick up who?
19 (0.7)
20 Lisa: Edna: .
21 Tom: E[ dna:?] (.) Where does she live?
22 Bob: [ mmm. ]
23 (0.6)
24 Lisa: On Anzac Avenue. but- (.) she just,- (1.2)
25 like last week she made me take her home
26 straightaway after the service. (0.4) so
27 I had to leave and then (0.7) c[ome back. ]
28 Bob: [Come back.]
29 (0.7)
30 Tom: Oh
31 Lisa: And just – she’s just re:ally, (.)
32 doesn’t think of anyone but herself.
33 (2.1)
34 Tom: Is she a youth student?
35 (0.5)
36 Lisa: No=
37 Bob: =No: she’s a °friend from school.°
38 (0.4)
39 Lisa: School friend.
40 Tom: ↑O:h (h)o(hh)k.
4 Transcription conventions and line numbers have been preserved from the original text.
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41 Lisa: She’s just really oblivious to
42 social etiquette.=
43 Tom: =Oh yeah.
44 Lisa: °Basically°
In lines 25–27, it can be inferred that Lisa felt Edna’s behaviour was not appro-
priate to a lift recipient. By the use of made and had to, it is clear that Lisa is
framing the extra trip as being obliged to do something against her will. At no
point does Lisa explicitly classify Edna’s behaviour as (im)polite but there is
an implicature (Grice 1975) that she evaluated her behaviour negatively; this is
reinforced by the initial framing in lines 15–16 that Lisa did not want to repeat
the experience. However, this negative assessment does not give an insight into
how Lisa believes Edna has violated the expectations of her role as lift recipient
and thus how it has disrupted the moral order. This only comes in lines 31–32
and 41–42, where ‘thinking of others’ and ‘etiquette’ is given social value, and
thus connected to broader ideologies about what is important in the negotiation
of social behaviour. And it is this connection between evaluation and the social
order that is socially argumentative and provides the rationale.
While Haugh does recognize the relevance of the reference to ‘thinking of
others’ and ‘etiquette’ to the moral order, he does not (explicitly) highlight it
in his analysis in respect to other types of evaluative activity. This is partly
because he is also focused on the interactional emergence of the evaluative
moment as negotiated by all the participants. However, this lack of attention
to the heterogeneity within evaluative behaviour is also more generally a fea-
ture of (im)politeness analyses: we recognize classifications, positive/negative
assessments and rationales all as forms of metapragmatic, evaluative behaviour
(which they are) but we do not particularly distinguish them and we do not
give precedence to the argumentativity – the rationale. I can recognize this in
my own work (e.g., Davies 2011), though perhaps as a critical discourse analyst
I rather take this link for granted. Many shifts in theoretical thinking are about
recognizing and articulating the obvious (but unstated) in what we already do.
But these are still important because they can enable us to refine our under-
standings.
Thus, I would argue that it is important to unpack the different aspects of
classificatory, assessing and argumentative elements from (im)politeness meta-
pragmatic behaviour. Each are important aspects of (im)politeness metadis-
course but they each indicate a different level of social meaning and they are
also independent of each other. For example, we cannot equate the classifica-
tion of behaviour as ‘polite’ with a positive assessment of that person or, con-
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versely, that ‘impolite’ behaviour means a negative assessment. It is true that
the relationship between these two often does pattern in that way but it is far
from monolithic: for example, it is possible for ‘polite’ behaviour to be nega-
tively assessed because it is viewed as artifice (Deutschmann 2003). Equally, a
negative assessment in itself does not reveal why the speaker has evaluated it
in that way – it does not provide the argumentative link to their construction
of the moral order.
To explicate this further, Table 1 uses constructed examples to show the
different types of relationships between classification, assessment and argu-
mentativity, and what we can take them to mean in terms of the idea of an
underlying moral order.
It is important to clarify that there is space for inferencing by the analyst
in this model but there are much stronger justifications for top-down inferenc-
ing (e.g., rationale to assessment) than for bottom-up inferencing (e.g., classifi-
cation to assessment). For example, if I say ‘He’s far too smooth and smarmy’
(Assessment, Table 1), I am fairly explicitly offering a negative assessment of
the person to whom I am referring. My addressee can probably also infer that
I think there is something problematic about that person’s behaviour – it is
inappropriate or impolite in some respect. Thus the classification is largely
inferable from the assessment. However, it would be harder for an addressee
to understand my rationale for making this assessment – at least, on the basis
of this evidence alone. They might invoke societal ideas about politeness as a
form of artifice and generate weak implicatures on this basis, but these could
only offer limited evidence for my understandings of the moral order. More
evidence – in the form of additional contributions to the ongoing discourse or
elements of a shared discursive history – would be needed to give deeper in-
sights into those understandings. Therefore, the rationale is not (easily) avail-
able from the assessment.
Indeed, even such top-down inferences may not always be accessible: these
might need further evidence to be interpretable. If I say ‘You can always tell
when someone’s been to a private school’ (Assessment, Table 1), it is not self-
evident in the UK context whether I am making a positive or negative assess-
ment. In order to access that judgement, one would either need further discur-
sive evidence in the progression of the talk (e.g., comment that gives insight
into the assessment) or personal knowledge about the speaker’s attitude to
private education and those who have been educated in that way. Thus, we
always have to be careful to substantiate the basis for the evidence we claim
and the degree of certainty we can allow our interpretation. This is particularly
key when we are acting as linguist observers and do not have a shared personal
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history with interactants – such understandings may be discursively construct-
ed over time and may not be directly evidenced in the talk at hand.5
It should also be noted that there is no requirement in this model for argu-
mentativity to emerge discursively: a stand-alone comment on an online news-
paper article, in a tweet or in a Facebook status has the potential to produce
ideologically-loaded social meanings through the positioning of social behav-
iour as (im)polite. As discussed in Section 2, evaluation through both talk-
in-interaction and metaparticipation are both valid sources for metapragmatic
analysis.
Argumentativity is preferred here to contested because although the latter is
associated with the lexis of discursive struggle, it does not distinguish between
differences in assessment (positive vs. negative) as compared to differences in
rationale (differences in the structure of the posited moral order). As we will
see, it is entirely possible for agents to agree on the assessment of a behaviour
as positive or negative (i.e., it is not explicitly contested), but disagree on the
reasons why it should be categorized in that way (i.e., it has a different argu-
mentative structure). And if we are interested in the ‘discursive struggle’ over
politeness – and thus over what constitutes the ‘moral order’ – then we need
to focus on argumentativity rather than classification or assessment because
this is where the work of structuring social meaning is achieved.
4 Data and methodology
The primary data for this article consist of 338 unique user-generated below-
the-line comments6 from three Daily Mail articles that covered the Penelope
Soto story. These articles were published over a period of one month, and each
deals with a different interaction that Soto had within the US court system. It
was decided to use data from all three because firstly, the comments often
referred back to the original story and secondly, it was insightful to see whether
assessments of Soto’s behaviour changed and how these assessments were jus-
tified in terms of their rationale.
The first courtroom interaction involves a bail hearing for a charge of ille-
gally possessing a prescription drug. Soto is a first time offender, and has not
5 Though such understandings are also not necessarily available to all those engaged in talk,
either. Engagement in itself does not guarantee that one has access to all relevant shared
understandings.
6 Duplicate comments and those that made comments not relevant to this study (e.g. sexual-
ized comments about Soto’s appearance) were excluded.
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previously experienced court. The purpose of the hearing is to assess whether
Soto should be allowed bail, what the surety for bail would be, and whether or
not she qualifies for free access to a defense attorney. Defendants stand in line
in a room separate from the court, connected only by a video link. They are
waiting their turn to be processed: these are routine encounters for a circuit
courtroom, which take only a few minutes each.
The initial courtroom interaction involving Soto can be divided into three
phases. In the first phase, Judge Rodriguez-Chomat tries to establish Soto’s
suitability for bail and whether she has sufficient funds to appoint her own
defense attorney. This includes a discussion of Soto’s assets, including her
claim to own jewellery. When the judge has completed his questioning, she is
assessed as not requiring a state defense attorney and a $5000 bail bond is set.
The setting of these terms concludes the normal business of the court hearing
and this phase of the interaction is completed by the judge dismissing Soto by
saying ‘Bye bye’, to which Soto responds ‘Adios’. She then leaves the front of
the queue and starts to move away, presumably to an exit that is out of sight
of the video link. It is this exchange that seems to be a turning point in the
interaction. In the second phase, the judge calls Soto back and increases the
bail bond to $10,000. He dismisses her for a second time, echoing her previous
use of ‘Adios’. In response, Soto ‘flips the bird’ (a rude hand gesture) and
swears at the judge as she turns away. In the final phase, the judge recalls
Soto again and asks her whether she swore, an action that she immediately
acknowledges. The judge finds her in contempt of court and sentences her to
30 days in the county jail. Soto responds with ‘That’s fine’ and turns away for
the final time. This completes the interaction.
What should have been an unremarkable encounter in the life of the court-
room had gone badly wrong, having extreme consequences for one of its pro-
tagonists. The issue taken up by both the media and their audience was why
and how this had happened: who was to blame? The Daily Mail reportage and
responses were no exception to this.
The Daily Mail is a British mid-market tabloid paper with a right wing, con-
servative stance. It is one of the most popular newspapers in the UK with a print
circulation of approximately 1.5 million (July, 2016, www.newsworks.org.uk/
Daily-Mail) and an overall reach via all platforms of nearly 30 million monthly.
It also has a very strong international presence. MailOnline is the most visited
English language website in the world and it has separate homepages for the
UK, USA, India and Australia (Mance 2014). Nearly 70% of its website traffic is
from users outside the UK, and the USA is particularly highly represented
(Sweney 2014). Indeed, for this USA-based story, a large percentage of the com-
ments were posted by users stating their place of residence to be the USA. It
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Table 2: Articles from The Daily Mail relating to Penelope Soto.
Date Headline Topic No. of Code
comments
05.02.2013 Are you serious? The moment Bail hearing 187 BAIL
female thief flips out at judge …
and gets jailed for THIRTY DAYS
as punishment (Reilly 2013a)
09.02.2013 Teenage girl who got 30-day jail Soto apologizes 90 APOL
sentence for flipping off a judge to Judge
gets released after tearful Rodriguez-
apology (Reilly 2013b) Chomat; released
from jail
02.03.2013 She cleans up well! Girl who Arraignment 61 ARRAIGN
flipped off Miami judge shows up hearing
in court looking prim and earns
APPLAUSE for change in attitude
(Daily Mail Reporter 2013)
was chosen for this research because of its relatively large audience and also
its strong presence in the USA.
Like many bulletin board systems, the Daily Mail comments section lists
postings in reverse chronological order (the most recent ones are at the top) and
there is no mechanism through which to create a ‘thread’. This kind of system
tends to discourage the development of discussion as the user is reading against
the temporal discursive structure (Wright and Street 2007; Davies et al. 2011)
and the user would have to use explicit addressivity (Herring 2001) to signal
that a post was intended as a response to another. There are occasions where
this does happen in these data but none of these conversations takes up (im)po-
liteness as their theme. Therefore, they will not be considered here. Instead, we
will be treating these postings as ‘one-shot’ metacomments on Penelope Soto’s
courtroom interactions.
The user-generated comments were analyzed in terms of any (im)politeness
terminology used (polite, impolite, rude, respect, manners, etc.). They were cate-
gorized according to whether they assessed Soto’s behaviour negatively or posi-
tively, whether they categorized Soto herself negatively, positively or neutrally
and whether they categorized the judge’s behaviour as negative or positive
(neutral assessments did not occur). Sometimes there was explicit evidence for
these judgements, in other cases an inference had to be drawn based on ration-
ales given and the broader discourses indexed. However, on occasion, the pos-
sible inferences were ambiguous and these examples were left unclassified (as
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in example 28, discussed in section 6). Finally, each comment was analyzed in
terms of the rationales given for the categorizations.
In the context of this article, the focus will be on close, qualitative analysis
of representative examples. However, these are drawn from an analysis data-
base that records a thorough dissection of each of these 300+ short texts. There-
fore quantitative information is provided where it can give a greater indication
of the landscape that a textual example inhabits. In the analysis that follows,
initial attention will be paid to classification and assessment of (im)politeness
behaviours in the texts before moving on to explore the argumentative ration-
ales underlying these aspects of the evaluations.
5 Analysis
The starting place for this analysis is the fact that there is near-universal agree-
ment from the posters that what Soto says and does in the initial courtroom
interaction is inappropriate. So there is not much variation here in the basic
classification of the behaviour as socially appropriate or problematic. However,
there were four comments (1% overall) where Soto’s behaviour was evaluated
non-negatively. Two examples of this are given below to show the kinds of
rationales that were given in this context.
(2)7 drago42, USA
She shouldn’t have to apologize. The judge is a crackpot and a bully. She
did nothing wrong. Absolutely nothing. He deserved to be flipped off. It’s
ok, most people apologize but don’t mean it in the legal system. There are
so many ridiculous laws that people “break” and get caught for, that didn’t
hurt anyone. The cops and legal professionals that enforce them are some
of the saddest, dumbest people on Earth. [APOL18]
(3) Armand Ippolito, USA
ohhhh please, cut the fake sympathy and congratulations. I wish she
would have stayed true to herself and flipped off the new Judge! FARK
THE MAN!!!!!! /and yeah, i’d hit it! [ARRAIGN 63]
Example 2 is the only one in the data that clearly classifies Soto’s behaviour in
the first phase of the interaction (up to the ‘Bye bye’ – ‘Adios’ exchange) as
7 All examples are reproduced as posted with any original typographical errors. The code
BAIL, APOL, ARRAIGN are used to identify the article that was being commented on and the
number represents its position in chronological sequence, from first to last.
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socially appropriate. It is more ambiguous on Soto’s swearing and gesture –
the use of deserve may suggest that her behaviour at this point would not
normally be considered appropriate but it at least positions her reaction as
justifiable in the context, using a negative evaluation of the judge as the ration-
ale. The argumentative move here is to link this individual judge’s perceived
failure to perceived failures in the justice system as a whole. In contrast, exam-
ple 3 does not seem to assess Soto’s behaviour as within societal norms but
does positively align itself with her by rejecting the validity of the basis for
those norms. This is clearly argumentative social behaviour because it is pro-
moting an alternative social order in which alternative social norms would
hold.
While these examples show that agreements in assessment of Soto’s behav-
iour were not monolithic, the quantitative picture shows a very high degree
of consensus. However, this is still interesting data from the perspective of
(im)politeness even though the classifications of the behaviour as appropriate
or not have clustered so neatly. The variability lies in whether Soto herself is
evaluated positively or negatively and how this is argumentatively constructed
using rationales about her linguistic pragmatic behaviour and other social prac-
tices. To get at the way in which social orders are constructed and contested,
we have to move beyond merely the metapragmatic classifications of (im)polite-
ness.
In these data, the key area of disagreement centered around the relation-
ship between the classification of the behaviour (positive/negative) and the
assessment of the person (good/bad). While most agreed the behaviour was
problematic, there was not such a consensus over whether such inappropriate
behaviour should be taken to index ‘bad personhood’ or not. However, by far
the most typical response from posters was to equate behaviour and person
and thus negatively evaluate both. This is perhaps not unsurprising given the
conservative, right wing political stance of The Daily Mail and thus its self-
selected readership.
(4) DVM, USA
GOOD FOR THE JUDGE! What a stupid, giggling idiot that girl is. Yes, she
has the right to freedom of speech and expression, but that comes with
the responsibility for the consequences of that freedom. Dis the judge, take
what the judge dishes out. Hope the little fool does some serious thinking
in jail and straightens out her life. [APOL 29]
81% of the comments involved explicit negative assessments of Soto, and these
often equate her negatively assessed behaviour with a bad inner self. In exam-
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ple 4, she is given absolute agency – it is constructed as a knowing and inten-
tional presentation of self – and that this bad inner self is enduring: she needs
to ‘straighten out her life’. Many of these involve positive assessments of the
judge, made either explicitly (21%), as above, or implicitly (a further 66%).
However, there was also a significant minority (7.4%) who classified Soto’s
behaviour as inappropriate but were unwilling to ascribe her an impolite inten-
tion. They often cited her inexperience of the courtroom context and also the
behaviour of the judge.
(5) Will, USA
This is ridiculous. Watch her body language. Seems more like she was
uncomfortable discussing the value of her jewelry, causing nervous laugh-
ter. And then he says “bye bye”, so she says “adios” with a smile, thinking
she’s being polite. The girls only 18, why is this whole country crucifying
her? [BAIL 210]
(6) Stevoid, UK
This man should have realised he was dealing with someone with either
under the influence of drugs, or had mental health issues. He DID seem
to be provocative, and did engage her in the familiar - and familiarising -
vernacular of her age/environment. She walked right into it with the adios
comment that seemed to enrage him. We might not like it, but we expect
our judges to demonstrate insight and restraint, forethought and wisdom
... which is why we pay them so much. This was lacking in this case ....
makes me wonder if the state animal on the flag behind him shouldn’t be
changed to a Kangaroo [BAIL 222]
Both examples 5 and 6 position Soto as an incompetent participant, either
through inexperience and nervousness or through an incapacity caused by
drugs or mental health issues. This implies at least a non-negative assessment
of Soto as a person (if not a positive one) as a non-competent person cannot be
held entirely responsible for their behaviour.8 To use a concept from Goffman
(1967: 45), Soto is constructed as not being a ‘usable participant’. This contrasts
absolutely with the previous example where the use of ‘responsible’ and ‘free-
dom’ position Soto as being at liberty to choose her course of action, thus mak-
ing the negative outcome a direct result of her agency. The argumentativity of
8 These are non-negative judgements in terms of an assessment of ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ person-
hood. However, these are certainly face-damaging statements for Soto since she is being posi-
tioned as a non-competent member.
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intent is latent in many of these posts but both examples 5 and 6 make a claim
for a polite intent more explicit, particularly around the key moment of the ‘Bye
bye – Adios’ exchange. In the former, this is constructed as ‘thinking she’s being
polite’ – clearly a reference to a polite intent – and in the latter as ‘she walked
right into it’. This metaphor of a trap being set for Soto is justified by the author
both claiming that the discursive context is emergent and dynamic, and posi-
tioning the judge as having the major responsibility for the management of
this – for which failure he is explicitly negatively assessed, thus releasing Soto
from (the major part of) blame.
The argumentativity of intent is based around both its unknowability (and
thus unchallengeability, see Hill 2007; Davies 2009) and whether or not an
impolite intent is necessary to activate impoliteness. Terkourafi (2011) demon-
strates that historically there has been little consistency in folklinguistic judge-
ments about this, with much variation in both time and space. Politeness theo-
rists are no more in agreement, with researchers such as Bousfield (2008, 2010)
and Lakoff (1989) claiming such an intent is a requirement, Terkourafi (2008)
claiming a distinction between impoliteness and rudeness on this basis and
those such as Culpeper (2011), Locher and Watts (2008) and Holmes et al.
(2008) claiming that impoliteness is a judgement made by the addressee, and
thus that a perception of impoliteness is sufficient. This makes it a versatile
resource for building broader social discourses. In this case, both sides claim
knowledge of intentions but then use this to structure different understandings
of social agency – to what extent someone in Soto’s position can act autono-
mously or is constrained by the institutional context and roles of the courtroom.
Those who position Soto as being buffeted by the court and the judge position
her as being at the whim of institutional agency and thus not in control of her
own destiny. Whereas the agentive Soto in example 4 becomes master of her
own fate – and she can then stand as a marker/proxy for other perceived ills in
society. This is apparent in the following three examples where Soto’s perceived
failures are mapped onto perceived failures of her generation and/or the par-
enting they received:
(7) CM, USA
Good. Today’s youth seems to have a sense of entitlement and that they
can act however they want with no reprecussions. Good to see a judge
actually putting their foot down! [BAIL 22]
(8) India Andrews, USA
Every year I have students like her. It’s sad how some parents fail to raise
their kids. [BAIL 99]
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(9) ProfNickD, USA
There you go, the end result of single moms attempting to raise children.
[APOL 80]
This is then linked to discourses about failures of parenting and/or family
breakdown (examples 8 and 9). Such moral panics about the behaviour of
young people have been present in society for a long period of time (Cohen
2011 [2002]), and are remade by each passing generation.9 The purpose of these
postings seems to be not so much to evaluate Soto’s behaviour as an instance
of (im)politeness but to reinforce societal hegemonies: it is the argumentative
link that can be made between Soto as an instance to the generic claims about
societal problems. Indeed, in examples like (8) and (9), it is only these argu-
mentative links that are stated: the assessment and classification processes
have to be inferred from the generic claim that is made. It also demonstrates the
argumentative nature of (im)politeness as a social tool: while as (im)politeness
theorists, we may be most interested in what evaluation tells us about (im)po-
liteness, it can also be used by speakers as a way of indexing other aspects of
the moral order.
The issue of intention is also related to the contested concept of sincerity –
another resource for argumentativity in these data, as we will see in the exam-
ples below. Speakers’ intentions in relation to sincerity (i.e., whether or not
they mean what they say) are as unknowable as their intentions vis-à-vis
(im)politeness. There is also disagreement regarding whether sincerity matters,
particularly in regard to politeness acts or phenomena that do not commit the
speaker to a future action whose absence would be noticeable (for example, an
apology in comparison to a promise). In these cases is taking the responsibility
for having the appropriate feelings (Searle 1969: 62), and thus greasing the
social wheels, sufficient in itself? Or does their absence mean the attempt is
hollow (Austin 1975) and therefore loses its polite illocution?
In her second appearance in court, Soto makes a tearful apology to Judge
Rodriguez-Chomat where she claims to have been under the influence of drugs
at the time of the bail hearing, thus providing an account for her claimed un-
characteristic behaviour. As a result, the ‘contempt of court’ charge is dropped
and she is released from county jail. Again, there is disagreement on whether
Soto should be assessed positively or negatively for her behaviour in this con-
9 Furedi (2015) claims the first mediatized moral panic relating to adolescent behaviour
related to the rise of the novel in the 18th century and the concomitant ‘excessive reading’.
Jane Austen’s protagonist in Northanger Abbey, Catherine Morland, gives some credence to
this.
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text. Largely, those who assess her negatively claim that her apology/presenta-
tion of self is insincere and is further evidence of her enduring bad self.
(10) Larry P., USA
She will be back. [APOL 2]
(11) kenzo, USA
3..2..1..Camera Roll....She’s turning on the water works. She’s a great ac-
tress. [APOL 53]
(12) jacka, USA
Punk, real outburst, fake apology, rotten outlook on life, justice system
will see her again. […] [APOL 64]
(13) Ruthie b., USA
She is not sorry. She will continue her lif of crime, I would bet. [APOL 102]
(14) Sharron, USA
This girl is trouble from the gitgo......nothing else to say. She only caved
so as not do any more time....she’s not foolin me. She will be in Court
again....down the road....you can take that one to the bank. [APOL 109]
In some cases the negative evaluation is located (at least partially) in a linguis-
tic categorization – ‘fake apology’, ‘not sorry’ – or by reference to perceived
insincerity in other aspects of her practice – ‘She’s a great actress’, ‘she’s not
foolin’ me’ – but in others it is left implicit. ‘She will be back’ in example (10)
can only be made relevant if the audience understands it as a judgement of a
perceived mismatch between what Soto has said in this hearing and her inner
self – only a ‘bad’ person will return to court, thus Soto’s apology must be a
faulty representation of her person. This move from negatively assessing Soto
for a claimed lack of sincerity to categorizing her as a future jailbird relies on
structuring an idea of the self where personhood is consistent: they are consist-
ently good or consistently bad. Thus one instance of negatively assessed behav-
iour is sufficient to justify an enduring negative evaluation of that person. Hill
(2007) discusses this idea of a ‘consistent inner self’ in relation to discourses
of defense against racism, where the objective is to demonstrate a good inner
self with which racist behaviour would be inconsistent.10 While the reverse
10 One key defense is the claim of a lack of intention (which is another interesting link to
the present case) but the other is to provide evidence of the person’s positive qualities – the
inference being that to behave poorly (to be racist) would be inconsistent with this and there-
fore it is not tenable.
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seems to be true here, it is the consistency of selfhood that is important – in
both cases it serves the ideological purpose of categorizing the person in the
desired way. This is made more explicit in the following example:
(15) BobbyHuertas70, USA
Her good behavior is feigned and shall not last long. A tiger doesn’t shed
its stripes. A leopard doesn’t change her spots. She’s garbage now and will
forever be. [ARRAIGN 4]
(16) elisabeth, USA
crocodile tears. [APOL 29]
(17) elisabeth, USA
Still wouldn’t hire her. [ARRAIGN 30]
In example (15) alongside an explicit reference to insincerity, ‘feigned’, the
poster invokes the biblical idiom ‘a leopard doesn’t change their spots’ to
evidence this assessment: since she has an enduring bad self, her seemingly
good behaviour must be insincere. Whereas in examples (16) and (17) we see
the same contributor maintaining their negative assessment – and the argu-
mentative link to sincerity – across responses to both the Apology and the
Arraignment newspaper articles. These individuals seem reluctant to entertain
re-evaluating Soto’s selfhood in the light of more evidence from social interac-
tions. It seems that once they have made the link between inappropriate be-
haviour and a bad enduring self in this context, they are not prepared to make
a re-assessment.
Of course, this argumentative move of exploiting the unknowability of sin-
cerity also has an impact on the structuring of the ideologies that constitute
folklinguistic theories of politeness. Sincerity is positioned as a key requirement
to moral behaviour and successful personhood. However, this is not consistent
across these data and it is particularly interesting to examine this issue in rela-
tion to the concept of ‘respect’, which is the most frequent politeness-type clas-
sification used in the comments. Contributions that invoke respect fall into two
categories: those that assume the doing of respect should be sincere and those
that see it as a common-sense requirement of the context (and thus sincerity is
not a prerequisite).
(18) kye. K, UK
Serves her right too. Kids and teenagers are far too disrespectful to
their elders now. They need to learn that their actions have consequences.
[BAIL 10]
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(19) Incorrectly_Right, USA
Good for that judge, but unfortunately she will still probably be a disre-
spectful little...yea...after this. [BAIL 25]
(20) JustMyOpinion, USA
What a disrespectful brat no wonder she is in there.Good going for the
judge. [BAIL 56]
(21) Art Vandalay, USA
Awww, and she’s so cute! That must be why she never had to learn the
meaning of “respect”. HAHA! Cops and judges teach that lesson really
well. Dang, though, she might lose her important job and expensive jewel-
ry!! [BAIL 161]
(22) Pak31, USA
Obviously a girl who was raised without manners, respect for authority/
adults, etc. I love the fact that the judge didn’t let her get away with her
nasty attitude but I don’t think releasing her early was a good idea. […]
[APOL 15]
The former of these categories is the more frequent, with 15% of BAIL hearing
comments invoking ‘respect’ in such a way that it is seen as an intrinsic good
and its lack is taken to index bad personhood. Examples (18)–(22) typify the
tone of these. In example (20), Soto’s perceived disrespect is a marker of an
inner bad self, explaining her presence in the courtroom whereas in examples
(19) and (22), she is assigned a ‘nasty attitude’ on the basis of her behaviour.
This is again constructed as an enduring (bad) self by the use of ‘still’ (19),
triggering an iterative presupposition (Levinson 1983). The failure to demon-
strate respect is also seen as a failure of parenting (22) or of society more gener-
ally, as in example (18) (see also discussion of examples (7)–(9) above). Exam-
ple (21) is interesting because alongside the invoking of ‘respect’, it implicitly
criticizes Soto for another insincerity of self – this time in terms of a perceived
exploitation of gendered behaviours. This is seen as a deliberate ‘act’ in order
to avoid proper engagement with expected conventions, and thus another fail-
ure of self.11 Because respect is given such moral value in terms of selfhood in
this set of comments, it can presumably only hold such value for these posters
if its use is sincere. This would fit with the argumentative value of sincerity in
the evaluations of politeness in examples (10)–(17) above. However, there is
11 I also note that the author of example (21) takes up the video of Soto as entertainment.
This is frequent within the postings and also the mediatized event in general. It is an important
aspect of mediatization and this form of ‘mediatainment’.
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also a small minority of contributors who recognize the necessity for respect
(either implicitly or explicitly) but construct it only as a social requirement that
has to be fulfilled in order for the encounter to run smoothly for the less socially
powerful participant, offering a different structuring of the moral order.
(23) Alexander –AC- H., USA
Haha what a dumbass. Don’t you know you should never disrespect a
judge? Especially the one who is in charge of your sentencing. [BAIL 21]
(24) Liz, USA
I loved the reaction of the people in the courtroom when she flipped the
bird. Everybody there knew that was a dumb thing to do. Everybody except
Miss Thang with the expensive bling! [BAIL 45]
(25) Flying J, USA
Rule Number One in the courtroom: don’t p--- off the judge. [BAIL 108]
(26) JanSliver, USA
[…] This silly teenager was in possession of illegal prescriptions and she
would have gotten away with a fine only if she shut her trap and respected
the court. Instead, she took it as a joke and treated the judge in a manner
that is considered contempt of court. [BAIL 192]
(27) dsgross309, USA
The judge handled that in a good way. […] He explained to the “idiot” why
it’s not right or proper to treat authority in a crass manner. Look, we all
know that authority can be wrong and horribly unjust but who doesn’t
understand -- when they control your life completely in the name of the
law -- that you have to bow to your master. It’s simple self preservation.
[APOL 105]
The failure to produce what is evaluated as ‘appropriate’ behaviour is now
constructed as a failure of logic or rationality rather than a moral failure. Soto
is constructed as being stupid rather than irredeemably bad. She is a ‘dumb-
ass’, is ‘dumb’, needed to ‘shut her trap’ to get away with it, and needed to
make a rational judgement about the powers of the judge in the courtroom and
behave accordingly: ‘It’s simple self preservation’ (27). This is a critical differ-
ence in the way that these two groups of posters are constructing the moral
order and the role of (im)politeness within it. An analysis of their classifications
of her behaviour as (im)polite, or even an analysis of positive/negative assess-
ments of her person, would not have revealed this difference. There’s no ques-
tion that the posters of both categories of comment negatively assess Soto’s
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behaviour and classify it as being inappropriate. There is also no criticism of
the judge in either set of posts. It is only by looking at the rationales behind
these judgements that the argumentative role of (im)politeness in the structur-
ing of the social and moral order becomes apparent.
6 Discussion
In this analysis, I have shown that the process of evaluation involves different
components, not all of which may be explicit in the talk or text, and not all of
which may be interpretable to the (linguist) observer. It is important to distin-
guish classification from assessment, and assessment from rationale, because
each of these categories provides different levels of evidence about the folk-
linguistic beliefs held by the speaker/text producer. I have argued that the
strongest level of evidence comes from understanding the rationale for an as-
sessment and/or classification because this provides the argumentative link
between the metapragmatic behaviour of classifying someone’s politeness-
in-action as (im)polite and/or assessing them as a person because of (im)polite-
ness behaviour: it drives those evaluative moments in talk.
It is argumentative (in Eelen’s [2001] sense) because it is this ideological
element that does the work of positioning both the speaker/producer and the
evaluated in relation to a moral order posited by the speaker; it is this that
makes it a ‘social tool’. Each individual action also functions to structure and/
or reinforce societal views about moral orders – thus providing a link between
the systematic understanding of the individual and the idea of societal norms
and how they are created, maintained and change.
Classifications and assessments come from a speaker’s understanding of
the moral order, of course, but they only provide limited evidence of what
precisely that might consist of. As an analyst, I might have hypotheses about
the underlying reason for those judgements but without further evidence, such
claims have to be regarded cautiously. One might use the metaphor of an ice-
berg – what is above the water gives only an indication of what lies beneath
it, and what lies below may be much larger than what is visible. By identifying
classificatory and assessing behaviour, we know that speakers are invoking a
moral order but that may be all we know. This can be demonstrated from these
data via an example that invokes the idea of ‘respect’ but had to be left uncate-
gorized in terms of its rationale:
(28) Mike, USA
You must respect those judges. [BAIL 38]
Brought to you by | University of Leeds
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/13/18 11:18 AM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON Evaluating evaluations 147
From looking at what is said and the discursive context in which it is said, it
is clear that: (1) Soto’s behaviour is classified as inappropriate; (2) She is being
negatively assessed by the speaker. However, there is no accessible evidence
through which a rationale can be reasonably or reliably ascribed. While I might
make inferences as an analyst about what the contributor might be indexing
by this – perhaps based on the popular view in these data of the necessity for
sincerity, and the lack of evidence to the contrary – without more knowledge
of that person, such inferences can only be quite weak. Therefore, I cannot
access the full argumentativity of this evaluation because I lack context.
Even where rationales appear to be accessible, caution still needs to be
applied and we need to provide evidence for interpretations. In the data analy-
sis above, I have used concepts and theoretical positions very familiar from
pragmatics (such as intention, sincerity, speech act theory, implicature, rele-
vance and presuppositions) and other subdisciplines of linguistics (e.g., modal-
ity and lexis) as well as drawing on more critical discourse analytic concepts
such as personalist ideology. In evaluative behaviour that emerges through
talk, then an array of concepts from conversation analysis – such as markers
of dispreferredness, turn-taking phenomena and adjacency – may become rele-
vant. It is not what (linguistic) tools we use that matter but the fit between
them and the type of language that we are analyzing, and their utility and
robustness in providing insights into the ideological stances that underlie meta-
pragmatic behaviour, and how those stances are taken up in talk.12
In these data, teasing apart the different elements that make up an evalu-
ation allowed a more systematic analysis. I started with a few initial insights:
there were few explicit classifications of (im)politeness (yet it was very clear
Soto was disapproved of); ‘respect’ seemed to be an important concept; and
certain contributors seemed very willing to seize on the potential for insincerity
in the apology. However, it was only when I pursued a more quantitative ap-
proach – of independently categorizing the posts according to (implied) classifi-
cations, (implied) assessments of person and the type of discourses that were
being invoked as support – that I could start to see the hierarchical relation-
ships between these different layers and thus provide a richer analysis. For
example, identifying ‘respect’ as a way of classifying (im)politeness behaviour
was of limited utility because different contributors were using that same classi-
fication to invoke varying moral orders. Equally, identifying the issue of sinceri-
ty in the apology did not explain in itself why contributors felt justified in their
continued negative view of Soto – finding the argumentative links made be-
tween bad behaviour and (enduring) bad personhood were essential to that.
12 See also Grainger (2011, 2013), who makes the argument that more traditional research in
pragmatics and politeness still has a contribution to make to discursive analyses.
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Thus, what I have provided is a systematic way to identify different components
in the evaluation process and to establish an orderly and robust way in which
to seek meaningful links between them.
Distinguishing different, ordered levels within the process of evaluation
may also be helpful in elaborating Kádár and Haugh’s (2013) position that
evaluation can be considered as part of both first order and second order polite-
ness. They make the argument that lay observers are as capable of theorizing
about language as linguists (although the kind of model produced might be
rather different). What they do not do is explain how we should differentiate
between first order and second order metapragmatic behaviour. However, sepa-
rating evaluative behaviour into categorizations, assessments and rationales
should allow us to do exactly that.
(29) jacka, USA
Punk, real outburst, fake apology, rotten outlook on life, justice system
will see her again. […] [APOL 64]
In the example above, there are classifications of Soto’s behaviour (‘real out-
burst’, ‘fake apology’), and there are also negative assessments of her person
(‘punk’, ‘rotten outlook on life’). These are tied to Soto, and tied to the moment
of vicarious participation. Thus, these would seem to be instances of first order
politeness. They are ‘politeness-in-action’, once removed. However, the ration-
ales that underlie these judgements are theorizations about the moral order of
society and robust mechanisms for judging people: (1) sincerity is essential to
proper behaviour, and (2) internal selves are consistent (personalist ideology).
Therefore, previous bad behaviour means Soto can be judged to have bad inten-
tions and accordingly be insincere. Thus, these rationales that give insights
into speakers’ perceptions of the moral order and how we assess people in
relation to that moral order are second order behaviours. We might argue over
whether the assessment of selfhood is within the realm of (im)politeness, rather
than being a broader sociological consideration, but the two are argumentative-
ly linked here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to refine our compre-
hension of the evaluation process and thus make analyses of metapragmatic
behaviour more robust and more straightforward to evidence. Identifying the
three components of the evaluation process means that the analyst can make
stronger claims regarding what weight of evidence each element can provide.
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With the enhanced role of metapragmatic behaviour in second and third wave
impoliteness research (Culpeper 2011; Grainger 2013), sharpening our under-
standing of how evaluation functions has become increasingly important.
In order to achieve this, Eelen’s concept of argumentativity has been elabo-
rated and operationalized in order to provide a way to ground evaluative meta-
pragmatic behaviour in the folklinguistic moral orders that shape its produc-
tion. This, too, has been a useful endeavour because argumentativity had been
left behind as evaluation was taken up, yet there was no replacement concept
to illuminate the ideological locus of evaluative activity. Instead, the ideological
role of evaluation was taken for granted but there was no differentiation in the
ideological effects of different metapragmatic behaviour.
As a side effect of this process, we have also gained greater insight into
the relationship between metapragmatic behaviour and the different orders of
(im)politeness. Locating the lay theorization of (im)politeness behaviour in the
element of rationale has acted to confirm Kádár and Haugh’s (2013) position
that metapragmatic behaviour should be recognized as occurring in both first
order and second order (im)politeness. In addition, it has refined their stance
by also identifying precisely which elements should be considered to be facets
of first or second order (im)politeness.
Evaluation is thus presented as the intricate part of (im)politeness behav-
iour that it should be recognized as being. Therefore, it can be used more
effectively to evidence the analytical process in contexts of both vicarious par-
ticipation and talk-in-interaction.
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